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Abstract 
 
Previous discussions of the desirability and impact of market-based reforms of state 
schooling while acknowledging positional elements in parental demand, have failed to fully 
examine their nature and implications. Contrary to the normal predictions of orthodox eco-
nomic analysis, competition in positional markets can result in inefficient outcomes. Pre-
dominantly relying upon recent British experience, we examine the extent to which com-
pulsory schooling can be viewed as a positional good and explore its implications for policy. 
In particular we consider whether policies targeting increases in parental choice can be 
designed to assist a rise overall levels of educational attainment.  
 
Key Words: schooling choice, educational markets, positional good, status competition 
JEL Classification: I20, I28, D11 
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1. Introduction 
The market choice critique of state schooling systems has proved influential in many 
Western countries in recent decades. The critique combines a belief in the potential effec-
tiveness of the market mechanism, based upon orthodox economic analysis, with a view 
that public provision of schooling creates chronic inefficiencies, based upon public choice 
theory. In practice, most governments have been unwilling to adopt full market or even 
voucher-based reforms of the prevailing state school systems. Instead one common ele-
ment of these reforms has been policies to increase parental choice (Whitty, Power and 
Halpin, 1998): increasing consumer’s power to exercise ‘exit and voice’ in the terms of or-
thodox economics. In Britain, for example, a combination of open enrolment, per capita 
funding and deregulated admission procedures has encouraged increased competition in 
local schooling markets. Educational researchers have been concerned to analyse the con-
sequences of these changes and attention has focused upon their impact upon the pattern 
of demand and curriculum diversity in local schooling markets. A more fundamental issue 
concerns the underlying motivation behind parental behaviour in schooling markets and 
whether strengthening individual parental choice produces an effective demand for im-
provements in overall educational attainment.  
Previous debates concerning the impact of parental behaviour in schooling markets has 
included some discussion of the consequences of education being viewed as a positional 
good (e.g. Jonathan, 1990; Ranson, 1993, Bowe, et al., 1994 and Tooley, 1995). It has 
been argued that a characteristic of positional goods is that the total level of welfare or 
benefits to be derived from such goods in a market is fixed. An increase in the benefits 
from ‘consumption’ for one individual must therefore be at the expense of benefits to oth-
ers. This follows since parents are presumed to be concerned with the educational attain-
ment of their children relative to other children in the cohort, not with their absolute level 
of attainment. An underlying rationale for such behaviour can be provided via fixed hierar-
chies of employment opportunities and social status linked to educational attainment and 
sustained across generations by cultural capital. Jones and Hatcher (1994) argue for the 
existence of a fixed hierarchy of employment opportunities. While Bourdieu and Passeron’s 
(1977) analysis of cultural capital’s role in perpetuating a hierarchy of social standing has 
formed a crucial part of many sociological analyses of recent educational policy (e.g. Ball et 
al., 1996). 
In this paper we seek to build upon previous discussions of the positional elements of 
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the demand for education by utilising insights from recent economic analyses of consumer 
behaviour. Our analysis distinguishes between consumption and investment elements of 
behaviour in schooling markets and identifies externalities resulting from this behaviour. 
We argue that positional elements appear more influential in the former behaviour than in 
the later. They act in a way to sustain hierarchies and can distort incentives to raise overall 
levels of educational attainment in local schooling markets. Our analysis enables a more 
wide-ranging examination of the policy implications of the presence of positional competi-
tion in schooling markets. This analysis also has significance for the broader school effec-
tiveness movement, since entrenched positional competition may be incompatible with 
reducing the dispersion of schooling outcomes.     
Initially we summarise previous analyses and identify the contributions made by Hirsch 
(1976) and Frank (1985) to the understanding of the nature of positional goods. By this 
means we aim to clarify on what basis, and to what extent, schooling may be considered a 
positional good. We are particularly concerned with the implication of accepting, following 
Hirsch, that education is only partially a positional good. Neither Hirsch, nor more recent 
commentators who have incorporated his positional good argument into their analyses, 
have discussed whether the degree of positionality is subject to policy influence or spelt out 
how a partially positional good exerts its effect on schooling market behaviour. 
The following two sections distinguish between parents as consumers and investors in 
educational markets, appraising the ranking versus absolute consumption theories of pa-
rental utility. In our analysis of investment behaviour we show how this same distinction 
underlies the divide between human capital and sorting models of the economic returns to 
education. In critically assessing the appropriateness of a ‘fixed sum’ approach to educa-
tional outcomes, we identify the existence of both consumption and investment external-
ities and explore the nature of labour market adjustments. In both of these sections we 
assess the evidence available on the rationale for, and extent of, positional competition in 
schooling markets. Our final section addresses the policy implications. In particular, given 
the existence of positional elements in parental behaviour we examine the implications for 
the design of policies which target increasing parental choice in schooling markets. 
2. Positional competition: a short review 
Earlier debates on the merits of markets in education included some reference to the 
idea of education as a positional good. Jonathan (1990) in developing her critique of mar-
ket-based schooling reforms partly relies upon positional good considerations. She asserts 
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that education’s value-in-exchange depends upon the amount held relative to others, not 
on its absolute value. The consequence, she claims, is that measures to increase individual 
opportunity and choice in schooling markets decrease social justice as a whole. As Tooley 
(1992) pointed out, Jonathan’s analysis appears to implicitly assume that ‘good schools’ 
and ‘good jobs’ are in fixed supply. These assumptions were made explicit by Ranson 
(1993), who viewed schooling as a screen that filters individuals into privileged occupa-
tions. He compares education to works of art or houses by the sea (following one category 
of positional goods suggested by Hirsch). Since such goods are physically in fixed supply, 
consumers’ desire for relative consumption causes the market mechanism to allocate them 
to the highest bidder. For Ranson in schooling markets the currency is social status, the 
“price paid for entry into privileged market niche’s is one manifestation of cultural capital” 
(p.337). Ball (1993) argued that for some consumers the “point about choice is that they 
‘require’ exclusivity and/or performance advantage, a levelling up of standards does not 
serve their interests” (p.12). For these critics the consequence of increased parental choice 
is inevitably to reinforce existing class divisions, without creating greater consumer voice for 
higher educational levels of attainment. 
Tooley (1995) in his reply to Ranson points out that positional good elements are at least 
equally likely in non-market schooling systems, and that zero-sum outcomes in competitive 
schooling markets are unlikely. It is this latter argument which we wish to examine. More 
precisely, if schooling is in part a positional good, will greater consumer choice strengthen 
incentives for an overall rise in educational attainments and economic growth or merely 
foster wasteful positional competition? 
Assessing the applicability of positional arguments to education is made complex by the 
multiple outcomes of schooling. Education provides immediate consumption benefits (pu-
pils’ enjoyment or otherwise, parents’ satisfaction with the status accorded by the social 
standing of their children’s school etc.) and various future (investment) benefits such as 
enhanced earning capacity and ability to enjoy a range of cultural and social activities. This 
distinction between consumption and investment benefits becomes important as we ex-
plore in more detail the nature of ‘positional goods’. 
Ancil and Hakes (1991) and Ackerman (1997) examine the antecedents of Hirsch’s rejec-
tion of a core assumption of orthodox consumer theory: asocial individualism. Orthodox 
economic theory generally assumes that an individual consumer’s desires, preferences and 
behaviour are determined independently of social institutions, culture and the behaviour 
and well-being of others. The desirability of positional goods and services, as expounded by 
Hirsch (1976), reflects their scarcity and/or sensitivity to social congestion or crowding. The 
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supply of schooling is clearly not subject to physical restrictions, the very short-run ex-
cepted. It is always possible to build another school, employ more teachers and buy more 
educational technology, although such expansion may be subject to diminishing returns. 
Similarly, it would appear to be always possible to create more ‘good’ schools according to 
conventional absolute definitions of ‘good’. Neither the critics of the school improvement 
agenda (e.g. Gewirtz, 1998) nor those questioning that quality is resource-dependent (e.g. 
Hanushek, 1996) argue that the quality of schools’ outputs is immutable or pre-
determined. What therefore is more relevant to education is Hirsch’s argument that posi-
tionality can reflect ‘social scarcity’. 
In conventional economic analysis the utility gained from a good or service is an increas-
ing function of its present and future consumption. For Hirsch, the value of education de-
pends upon both absolute and relative levels ‘consumed’, with many consumers seeking 
status based on exclusivity or scarcity. These latter considerations lead to positional compe-
tition, where individual parents attempts to improve their child’s relative position encour-
age imitation, and can result in both low private and social marginal returns to increases in 
the resources devoted to schooling1.  
Noting that consumer behaviour will be based upon the expected, rather than the ac-
tual, consumption and investment benefits of a high ‘relative’ consumption, Frank (1985) 
developed more formal models of positional consumption. Utility from consumption de-
pends upon context, each individual’s consumption behaviour affects the frame of refer-
ence within which others evaluate their own consumption behaviour. He argued that this 
frame of reference effectively becomes a public good influencing the subjective well-being 
generated by individual behaviour. The uncoordinated decisions of individual parents can-
not produce an optimal output of this or any other public good. In his analysis of ‘local’ 
status, individuals are largely concerned with within-group comparisons. He argued that 
position matters were particularly important when choosing for one’s child and educational 
decisions were identified as an example where interpersonal comparisons were particularly 
important. As Mason (1998) points out, both Hirsch and Frank viewed demand for posi-
tional goods and services as being consistent with standard economic theory’s assumption 
of the rational pursuit of self-interest, though they did differ as to the main implications of 
the consequences of widespread positional behaviour. Whereas Hirsch’s main concern was 
the absence of any strong relationship between economic growth and social welfare, 
                                               
 1  Though where the existing provision of schooling is sub-optimal, for example the staying-on rate after compulsory 
schooling is too low, then such positional competition may be socially beneficial. 
  8 
Frank’s was the bias against saving and leisure in competitive markets and the consequen-
tial need for regulation to promote social welfare. In the context of local schooling markets, 
Frank (1997) argued that the tendency for families to seek to buy houses closer to ‘better’ 
schools reallocates family expenditure away from retirement savings and inflates certain 
house prices without raising social welfare2.  
Frank argued that ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ effects in combination with the prevailing frame 
of reference would cause this wasteful competition to persist over time. In contrast, Con-
gleton (1989) pointed out that the social desirability of status-competition depends crucially 
upon the net effect of externalities or spillover effects generated. Transferring Congleton’s 
argument to the schooling market, what matters overall is whether those demanding 
highly-ranked education for their children, have the effect of raising or lowering the gen-
eral quality of education in society. As Congleton argued, there are both consumption and 
investment externalities: one individual’s consumption and investment of schooling affects 
the consumption and investment returns available to other individuals. For example, the 
inclusion of a disruptive child in a class may affect the level of educational attainment of 
their peers. However, contrary to the arguments of Jonathan and Ranson such externalities 
are not inevitably negative. For example, one parent’s decision to invest in more schooling 
eventually increases the supply of educated workers and raises the probability that an em-
ployer can fill a vacancy for a ‘good’ job. As a consequence more ‘good’ jobs are created. 
As Snower (1996) has argued, national differences in the exploitation of such trading ex-
ternalities can account for observed differences in the proportion of ‘good jobs’ in an 
economy’s labour market. We now consider consumption and investment behaviour in 
turn. 
3. Positional Considerations and the consumption demand for educa-
tion 
As Mason (1998) has shown, orthodox economic analysis of consumer behaviour has 
neglected status consumption, recognising at best only a narrow Veblenian interpretation 
of conspicuous consumption. This is notwithstanding Leibenstein’s differentiation, as far 
back as 1950, between Veblen, snob and bandwagon effects and substantial empirical 
evidence indicating the importance of relative standing in consumer behaviour (for exam-
                                               
 2  Frank’s argument is not fully convincing, since in a competitive housing market the lower house prices close to ‘un-
popular’ schools should enable these residents to allocate more towards schooling, retirement etc. 
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ple, Easterlin, 1995 and Solnick and Hemenway, 1998). For Leibenstein a ‘Veblen effect’ 
arises when consumer demand for expensive goods and services is influenced by the im-
pression made upon other consumers. However, the social interdependence of an individ-
ual’s demand function also reflects ‘bandwagon effects’, where demand is positively influ-
enced by the number of other consumers purchasing it, and ‘snob effects’ where willing-
ness to pay reflects exclusivity. Corneo and Jeanne (1997) argue that these latter two types 
of incentives for conspicuous consumption may be categorised as a desire not to be identi-
fied with the poor and the desire to be identified with the rich. If social norms allocate 
status in such a way that the second type of incentive dominates the demand for an ob-
servable good or service then a snob effect appears. 
Research into parental behaviour suggests that in the case of schooling ‘Veblen’, ‘snob’ 
and bandwagon’3 effects may exist in different segments of the market. The snob effect 
may dominate amongst the active middle-class consumers, and Veblen effects amongst 
those who opt-out of state schooling. However, there are likely to be some elements of 
consumption behaviour, such as a child’s freedom from bullying and attaining mutual re-
spect, where utility reflects absolute and not relative performance. 
Market-based reforms in the UK appear to have given a new impetus to the ability of 
skilled and privileged choosers to generate Veblen, snob and bandwagon effects. Echols 
and Willms (1995) found that parents’ socio-economic status was an important determi-
nant of the exercising of choice and since their study many other small scale and qualitative 
studies have reached similar conclusions. For example, Gewirtz et al., (1995) argue that 
parents choose on the basis of the class mix of intake and that the: “use of cultural capital 
in the decoding of schools and interpretation of information and in the ‘matching’ of a 
child to a school is a crucial component of choosing and then getting a school place…” 
(p.56). Woods et al., (1998) whilst confirming the greater emphasis which middle class 
parents place on instrumental-academic outcomes note that this tendency differs across 
local schooling markets. Their study found that child-centred factors were an important 
factor for all parents exercising choice. Initial large-scale quantitative studies by Gorard and 
Fitz (2000) dismiss the argument that schools are becoming more socially segregated, 
though Gibson and Asthana (2000) have challenged their methodology. Comparative stud-
ies of the consequences of increased school choice suggest the importance of historical, 
institutional and societal differences. In the Netherlands strict streaming and increased di-
                                               
 3  The bandwagon effect has been incorporated into recent economic analyses of informational cascades and applied to 
the incentives for conformity in schooling markets (Adnett and Davies, 2000). 
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versity between schools has meant that increased choice has only been associated with 
slight increases in social differences between schools (Teelken, 1998). In contrast, in New 
Zealand published details of the socio-economic mix of pupils appears to be used by par-
ents to infer school quality, even when at the secondary level data on the performance of 
students in national tests is also available (Fiske and Ladd, 2000). As a consequence polari-
sation both in terms of ethnicity and social class has been further encouraged.  
It would seem that an improvement in the social status of one school must be at the ex-
pense of others, however if parents do not share a common frame of social reference this 
may not be the case.  For instance, some parents may gain satisfaction from the greater 
religious socialisation offered by a Muslim or Christian school, whilst other parents need 
not feel disadvantaged by the absence of such religious socialisation at the school they 
have chosen. Because there are multiple potential bases for the achievement of social 
status, an increase in the social status of one individual is not necessarily at the expense of 
another, even if all social hierarchies, perceptions and cultures were fixed. However, poli-
cies (such as school league tables) that act intentionally or unintentionally to secure a more 
strongly shared frame of social reference will tend to strengthen positional competition 
within education. As New Zealand experience illustrates such competition need not be on 
the basis of levels of educational attainment. Though the more that schooling emphasises 
success in terms of a uni-dimensional ranking, the greater the positional component of the 
outcomes. In these circumstances, generating a sense of failure accompanies generating a 
sense of success and the relativity in pupils’ immediate consumption benefits from their 
enjoyment of being in school will depend in part on the degree to which the school pre-
sents achievement as absolute or relative.  
4. Positional concerns and the investment demand for education 
Positional concerns in schooling markets are unlikely to be limited to consumption bene-
fits alone. As Power (2000) argues “members of the middle class largely depend upon the 
credentials bestowed by the education system to acquire or hold on to their position” 
(p.134). In turn it has become commonplace (for example, Fershtman and Weiss, 1993) to 
relate social status to the average wage and skill-level of those employed in any particular 
occupation. The investment benefits of schooling may be divided, for simplicity, into earn-
ings benefits which give command over higher levels of future consumption and participa-
tion benefits in terms of ability to enjoy the opportunities for wider socio-cultural interac-
tion. Orthodox economics emphasises the former and claims that future earning power 
  11 
predominantly reflects the impact of schooling on productivity rather than through returns 
from ‘old boy’ networking or other channels. 
The dominant human capital approach claims a causal link between absolute invest-
ments in schooling and earning power through the influence of knowledge and skills on 
productivity. This effect is assumed to be independent of the impact of ability and cultural 
capital, assumptions that are rejected by the sorting (signalling/screening) approach. The 
latter argues that investments in schooling have little direct influence on productivity, but 
instead provides signals of ability or preferred personal characteristics to potential employ-
ers. In the human capital approach an individual’s expected economic return to schooling, 
and therefore their demand, is assumed to be based upon the absolute investment in 
schooling. In sorting models, schooling is correlated with unobservable productivity differ-
ences that predate schooling decisions. Employers make inferences about these productiv-
ity differences from an individual’s schooling choices. Hence this sorting behaviour encour-
ages a positional demand for investments in education. In credentialism, often grouped 
with sorting models, wage differences are independent of productivity differences and 
education need have no effect upon productivity. According to this approach increases in 
absolute levels of educational attainment merely induce higher educational entry tariffs to 
be applied to the ‘good jobs’. Empirical studies, surveyed by Weiss (1995) and Topel 
(1999), whilst generally rejecting credentialism and supportive of human capital ap-
proaches, rarely completely reject the importance of sorting considerations. 
In the human capital approach the actual returns to investment, the premium offered to 
educated workers, will depend upon the balance of demand and supply. As levels of typical 
affluence increase, the material and knowledge requirements for full participation in society 
also increase. Education equips individuals with skills in communication, critical evaluation 
and a greater ability to learn. Developments in the prevalence of information and commu-
nications technology and in the complexity of external economic and commercial pressures 
suggest a need for increased and re-focused schooling to maintain levels of social participa-
tion (Flores and Gray, 2000). Higher education levels may lead society to create more com-
plex, less accessible, forms of interaction which bring greater satisfaction at the expense of 
the social participation of those with lower levels of education. In this scenario then the 
positional aspect of education is strengthened, whether this is socially beneficial again de-
pends upon the externalities generated. As emphasised in recent models of endogenous 
growth, general increases in the levels of educational attainment are likely to be a major 
source of positive social externalities. For example, the learning which contributed to the 
development of e-mail, the internet and mobile phones can be reasonably regarded both 
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as a source of economic growth and as enabling greater social interaction for a wide sec-
tion of society. Likewise, a more educated worker may not only have a positive spillover 
effect on the productivity of colleagues, but may also improve the quality of interactions in 
the workplace through a deeper understanding of social interaction and communication 
skills.  
The presence of positive social externalities from private investments in schooling pro-
vide one reason for rejecting a simple zero-sum approach to educational outcomes. More 
fundamental is the impact upon the long-run economic performance of developed econo-
mies. There is  a mass of empirical work suggesting that the overall growth rate is sensitive 
to the level of investment in schooling (Blundell et al., 1999 and Topel, 1999). It seems 
clear that in the medium and long-term the supply of ‘good jobs’ is not fixed. Instead, sup-
ply is sensitive to patterns of supply and demand in the labour market and to the overall 
success of the national economy in achieving economic growth and sustaining international 
competitiveness. It is also now apparent that the recent growth of labour market inequality 
in the UK is a reflection of the growth in returns to educational investments not, as sug-
gested by Jones and Hatcher(1994), a consequence of their fall. As Machin (1998) points 
out the switch in demand towards the more educated and skilled has been sufficient in the 
UK since the mid-1970s to increase the wage differential earned by more educated work-
ers notwithstanding the large increase in the relative supply of the latter. That is the supply 
of ‘good jobs’, or at least those that pay a premium to educated workers, has increased as 
average schooling investments have increased. Francesconi et al., (2000) argue that a fur-
ther consequence of this bias in technological change has been to cause a higher equilib-
rium rate of unemployment for the less educated. 
Whilst the weight of evidence is as summarised above, a number of recent UK studies 
offer some limited support for the credentianlist hypothesis. Robinson and Manacorda 
(1997) analyse the occupational and educational structure of employment for 1984-94 and 
conclude that the increased holding of qualifications over time simply results in employers 
upping the educational requirements for an occupation. Sloane et al., (1999) conclude that 
nearly a third of British workers were over-educated for their employment. Whilst Green et 
al., (1999) find little evidence of widespread qualifications inflation, they do find that the 
increased demand for more educated and skilled labour has not produced uniform higher 
returns to education. The type of education in terms of skills acquired and curricula studied 
are important in determining returns, not just the level of educational attainment. 
In summary, the evidence available suggests that in general the economic and social life-
time returns to schooling are based upon absolute rather then relative levels of schooling. If 
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this is the case then there is no economic rationale for a strong positional element in the 
investment behaviour of parents, children and students in schooling markets. Though 
whether parents who expected returns to investments in positional competition are pro-
vided with effective signals to the contrary remains an important question.     
5. Positional competition and schooling market outcomes 
Our discussion above suggests that Hirsch was correct in arguing that schooling was 
partly a positional good. In this final section, we initially need to consider the desirability of 
positional competition in schooling markets. Much of the previous discussion of market-
based reforms has implicitly assumed that positional competition is inevitably economically 
wasteful and socially undesirable. Our analysis has indicated the need for a more cautious 
assessment, since positional competition can generate both positive and negative external-
ities. Given our particular interest in recent market-based reforms, we can restrict our fur-
ther discussion to a more limited question. Educational reforms have commonly further 
empowered active choosers in schooling markets. Given that these decision-makers are 
partly motivated by positional considerations, how do these considerations influence the 
impact of reforms on overall levels of educational attainment? 
Where positional considerations apply then several conventional economic policies to in-
fluence demand may be counter-productive. For example, applying the logic of Corneo and 
Jeanne (1997) to schooling markets, punitive taxes on private school fees can in certain 
circumstances actually stimulate demand for private schooling. Similarly, the ‘poor’ may 
prefer the continued presence of private schooling, although its effect is to increase ine-
quality. This follows, as Biggs and Dutta (1999) argue, if state schooling suffers from con-
gestion and the rich pay for state schooling through taxes but do not use it. In general, 
positional considerations may make it difficult for governments to generate voter support 
for policies to reallocate educational resources to ‘unsuccessful’ inner-city or high-cost rural 
schools (Kozol, 1991). Suburban voters do not wish to create stronger competition in post-
compulsory education and the labour market for their own children. They will therefore 
sustain allocations of public educational expenditures that may be inefficient in terms of 
overall national levels of educational attainment. Policy therefore needs to mould the frame 
of reference of parents in a socially beneficial way, whilst also discouraging individual par-
ents from participating in positional competition. In Frank’s terms, what policy needs to 
encourage is the universal adoption of a frame of reference in parental decision-making 
that stresses private net benefits and positive externalities and abhors negative externalities.  
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In order to provide a coherent framework for discussing policy implications, we need to 
abstract from our preceding analysis the factors determining the extent of positional com-
petition in schooling markets. In general, the positional element in the demand for educa-
tion will be greater if: 
(i) utility reflects relative rather than absolute present and future consumption;  
(ii) there is less variety in frames of reference employed independently by parents 
(fewer sub-groups and sources of social status);  
(iii) the occupational structure and relative wages are less responsive to changes in the 
to changes in educational attainment; 
(iv) educational provision is less responsive to changes in labour demand and is more 
geared to reproducing current socio-political structures;  
(v) the time horizon is short. 
The extent of positional competition in schooling markets will also reflect the expecta-
tions of parents about the size of these five determinants, not just their actual values. 
Schooling policy can be designed to influence parental expectations and each of these fac-
tors individually. We illustrate by considering factor (iii): the variety of frames of reference. 
One major weakness of our analysis has been the neglect of peer group effects and 
other externalities, including voluntary donations from parents, which cause there to be 
potential social benefits from having integrated schools. In certain circumstances, segrega-
tion can lead to under-performance and under-investment in terms of effort and resources 
by parents, pupils and teachers in the lower-ranked schools, which is both inefficient and 
inequitable (Adnett et al., 1999). Greater social integration can however produce a trade-
off between the short-run costs borne primarily by rich/active parents and the long-run 
benefits of faster economic growth felt by everybody. 
An associated problem resulting from increased parental choice is that active searchers 
determine market norms, even when their tastes are not those of the more passive par-
ents. Gewirtz (1998) shows how the undersubscribed and ‘unsuccessful’ schools in local 
markets, even those effectively targeting the needs of their existing clientele, may seek to 
‘improve’ by changing their provision to attract middle class parents. If it is the case, as 
Lauder et al. (1999) argue, that middle-class parents take a longer-term perspective to edu-
cational decision-making, then this specific bias produced by the marginal, active parents 
may be thought to be desirable. However, this presupposes that the type of schooling 
which produces the highest returns is the same for all pupils, an assumption we have pre-
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viously questioned (Davies and Adnett, 1999). If segmentation (by ability and parental cul-
tural capital) concentrates positive peer group effects in particular schools then existing 
school rankings are reinforced, at the same time as we observe a convergence on tradi-
tional academic schooling in local markets. 
 
Different policies have been introduced to try to address this issue. In some local school 
markets in New Zealand, over-subscribed schools are required to select intake via ballot, 
instead of academic merit or ‘suitability’, in order to promote social mix (Lauder, et al., 
1999). In Finland, one local authority has paid the bus fares of those opting on the grounds 
of specialist academic provision for schools outside of the neighbourhood (Ahonen, 2000). 
In a UK context, Beacon schools and the ‘superhead’ initiatives may be seen as a way of 
imitating integration without requiring the same degree of short-run costs to be borne by 
the parents of those in highly-ranked schools. Value-added league tables which provide 
information relevant to all parents, regardless of the ability of their children, are a further 
mechanism to try to encourage the a diversity in the frames of reference employed in 
schooling choices. 
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